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Fit for Purpose and Fit for the Future?  
An Evaluation of the UK’s New Flood Reinsurance Pool 
Abstract 
Flood Re is widely hailed as an innovative approach to disaster risk insurance. This paper 
offers a mixed-methods evaluation of the new pool, asking whether it is “fit for purpose” and “fit 
for the future”. The investigation considers the roles of the public and private sectors, risk 
modelling and risk communication, technical underwriting, distributional aspects and the 
behavioural implications of Flood Re, particularly with regards to risk reduction and prevention. 
The paper concludes that the new pool is a transitional reinsurance arrangement that supports the 
private insurance market and secures affordability of flood insurance in the UK through premium 
subsidies. However, this approach is likely to come under pressure in the face of rising flood risk 
as it fails to incentivize flood risk management and risk reduction efforts. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural disasters such as drought, flooding and wind storms cause significant human and 
economic losses, affecting communities, businesses and governments and hampering economic 
development and poverty reduction efforts. In many countries, such disasters are becoming more 
likely with climate change according to projections by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”). Moreover, the values at risk are also becoming even greater due to increasing 
population concentration and rising wealth, often in highly exposed coastal locations. These 
trends have re-intensified discussions among private insurers, governments and international 
organizations about the role of insurance in addressing disaster risks. The discourse follows two 
broad strands: reform of existing insurance schemes, such as in the United Kingdom and the 
United States; and the design of new schemes in countries without disaster insurance, including 
in developing countries (see, for example, Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2014). Such efforts are 
based on the understanding that insurance mechanisms offer a more effective way of addressing 
the costs of disasters than relying on post-disaster payments (see, for example, Hallegatte, 2014; 
and Brainard, 2008). The sharing of risks and the distribution of the costs of compensation make 
insurance an attractive disaster response mechanism, particularly for large catastrophic risks 
(Mechler et al., 2014), but remains underused in many parts of the world.  
In countries that have disaster insurance, this tends to be arranged through the state or via 
a partnership approach between the public sector and private insurers, owing to the complex 
nature of disaster risks. The affordability and availability of disaster insurance can become a 
public policy goal, seeking to ensure that an economically efficient level of insurance is provided 
and accessible to those who need it. However, in many cases, governments face conflicting 
objectives and aims; in particular, being concerned with reducing public expenditure on flood 
losses, but at the same time remaining keen to offer a “helping hand” in times of flooding. If and 
how government intervenes in the flood insurance market therefore depends, at least in part, on a 
country’s specific risk features, cultural approach to solidarity and responsibility, political will, 
as well as recent loss experiences (Kunreuther et.al. 2009).  
 
There are many different ways in which disaster risk insurance can be supported by the 
government, ranging from direct premium subsidies to providing financial education.. Table 1 
 shows how possible interventions can target the supply of insurance, the demand for insurance, 
or premium levels. 
Table 1. Public Disaster Risk Insurance Interventions with the Aim  
of Increasing Take-Up of Insurance 
Target Area Intervention Measure 
Supply Set-up state-owned insurer 
Provide reinsurance 
Provide capital 
Pay operational costs 
Provide product development expertise and technical support 
Promote co-insurance pool 
Link to social safety nets and credit facilities  
Premium Levels Regulate premiums by setting limits or tariffs 
Regulate risk models used 
Data collection, audit, management and financing (can lead to higher premiums) 
Provide risk data to insurers (can also lead to higher premiums) 
Reduce risk levels through better risk management 
Demand Pay premiums in full or part 
Offer vouchers for insurance 
Offer incentives for insurance 
Mandate insurance 
Provide risk data / awareness campaigns 
Financial education 
 Promote enabling environment via legal framework and consumer protection 
Source: Vivid Economics et al., 2016. 
The types of government intervention in disaster insurance markets vary significantly 
between countries, ranging from no insurance, to only private or fully public insurance. (Paudel 
2012; Lamond and Penning-Rowsell 2914) For example, whilst French law requires certain 
kinds of insurance contracts to cover natural catastrophes and fixes an additional amount payable 
by the insured (Maccaferri et al., 2012), the UK government has focused on making flood 
insurance more affordable by improving reinsurance options for insurers through its flood 
reinsurance program, ‘Flood Re’. Whilst the former can be considered a more ‘public’ approach 
to flood insurance, the latter has continued to rely predominantly on the private market.  
One aspect that is growing in importance, but remains often overlooked in the public 
policy discourse, is the suitability of insurance mechanisms to cope with changing risk profiles. 
 This is particularly relevant in the face of rising disaster costs due to socio-economic factors and 
climate change, which can pose a threat to future insurability.  
These trends can negatively impact the business model of the insurance industry itself, 
possibly making insurance unavailable or unaffordable. Currently, the industry’s best defence 
against this is the one-year contract relationship with clients, which does not require an 
assessment of long-term risk, and offers flexibility to amend and adjust price coverage on an 
annual basis. However, this is only a short-term defence against rising risk. If significant efforts 
are not taken to reduce risk by increasing resilience, costs will continue to rise and insurers may 
stop offering climate change-related insurance products, as noted by the UK’s regulator PRA 
(Prudential Regulation Authority, 2015); indeed, adaptation could feasibly become a pre-
requisite to receiving insurance (Golnaraghi et al., 2016).   
Purchasing an insurance product can influence the behaviour of those at risk. This can 
either be in a moral hazard1 context, where insurance can lead to more risky behaviour, or as an 
incentive, where insurance can trigger risk reduction investments or the implementation of 
prevention measures (see, for example, Kunreuther, 1996; and Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 
2009). Despite a renewed interest in risk reduction by policy makers and regulators in their quest 
to find ways to use insurance in order to insulate public finances from the financial impact of 
natural disasters (for a summary, see Golnaraghi et al., 2016; Prudential Regulation Authority, 
2015; and European Commission, 2013)in practice most disaster insurance schemes are not 
designed or operated with prevention in mind.  (Surminski and Hudson, 2017; and Surminski et 
al., 2015). This raises questions about their suitability and effectiveness.  
These challenges are also evident in the UK, which has a long tradition of private flood 
insurance. Flooding is recognized as the most common and costliest kind of natural 
disasterCommittee on Climate Change, 2016) and is listed as a major risk on England's National 
Risk Register (Cabinet Office, 2015). While the recent flood loss trends in the UK are largely 
due to socio-economic factors, such as continuing development in exposed areas, climate change 
is expected to exacerbate these impacts (IPCC, 2013). Indeed, the UK Climate Change Risk 
Assessment (CCRA) 2017 has identified flood risk management as a priority area for action, as 
                                                 
1 Moral hazard occurs when a member of the party acts conversely to the principles set out in an agreement between 
those parties. For example in an insurance contract, the individuals’ motives and behaviour to prevent loss may be 
reduced if financially protected through a policy, thus resulting in an increased probability of loss. For more detail 
on moral hazard, please see Arrow (1968) and Pauly (1968). This can affect governments, where the existence of an 
insurance scheme may reduce the urgency to prevent and reduce risks, or at the insured level, where the purchase of 
insurance may lead to a false sense of security.  
 flood risks are projected to increase significantly across the UK throughout this century 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2016).  
Against this backdrop of growing flood risk a new reinsurance pool was created by 
government and industry: : Flood Re, a not-for profit reinsurance pool owned and operated by 
the insurance industry, developed by industry and government, established through the Water 
Act 2014 and launched in 2016. It has been presented by industry and government as an “ 
innovative way to ensure the availability and affordability of flood insurance, without placing 
unsustainable costs on wider policyholders and the taxpayer” (DEFRA, 2013). The pool is 
designed as a temporary support measure for those high-risk properties that may face rising 
insurance premiums in a competitive market. Presented as a “cushion” to smooth an eventual 
transition to risk-reflective pricing, it remains unclear if and how Flood Re will achieve this in 
the face of rising flood risk, especially because in its current set-up, it does not provide any direct 
means to encourage risk reducing behaviour (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015; and Hjalmarsson 
and Davey, 2016).  
This raises the question whether Flood Re is fit for purpose and fit for the future, and 
what lessons can be drawn for governments seeking to navigate between public policy and 
private market solutions to address affordability and availability of flood insurance.  
As Flood Re only came into operation in April 2016, there is very limited quantitative 
evidence, while for the broader flood insurance market in the UK many of the metrics needed for 
an assessment are not publicly available. This shortfall can be addressed by applying a mixed-
methods approach to the evaluation, as outlined in Section 2. After a brief reflection on the 
history of flood insurance in the UK and the justification for Flood Re (Section 3), this paper 
assesses the pool against five broad parameters: (i) the contribution to technical risk cost 
modelling and risk communication, (ii) the roles of the public and private sectors, (iii) whether 
insurance incentivizes risk reduction by policyholders, (iv) how it contributes to take-up rates of 
flood insurance, and (v) how insurance distributes the costs of disaster events (Section 4). This 
leads to an overall evaluation of the “fitness for purpose” and “fitness for the future” of Flood Re 
with some recommendations (Section 5), and a discussion of possible implications for other 
countries (Section 6).  
2. A Brief Reflection on Methods and Data  
The literature provides many assessment criteria for insurance mechanisms including for 
those created through public policy interventions. Key aspects of these assessment criteria are 
 availability of cover for the insured, affordability of cover for the insured, whether the 
mechanism is financially sustainable (i.e. whether it is able to pay claims and stay solvent), and 
whether the mechanism is commercially viable for insurers participating in it, provided private 
sector involvement is required (Surminski and Hudson, 2017; and Surminski, 2014).  
Traditionally, the focus has been on classic supply and demand questions, exploring the 
cost-effectiveness of an insurance scheme for any given policyholder, as well as the market-level 
efficiency in meeting as large a proportion of the potential demand as possible. In addition, given 
that public funding is sometimes used to support insurance with an explicit or implicit 
justification based on providing a public good, cost-effectiveness must take into account whether 
this funding is achieving good value for money. Finally, there is the longer-term financial 
sustainability of an insurance mechanism in the face of risk.  
These aspects provide a starting point for determining whether Flood Re is fit for 
purpose, based on its stated objectives of securing affordable and available flood insurance. The 
main criteria to look at are price of cover before and after the intervention, and any evidence for 
level of penetration and take-up before and after. Many of those metrics still remain unclear for 
Flood Re due to its nascent character and the private sector underwriting that is underpinning it. 
As Flood Re only commenced operation in April 2016, there is very limited data to underpin an 
assessment of its effectiveness, impact and policy consequences. For instance, analysing the 
future behaviour of insurers faces data limitations as the risk models that are commonly used by 
insurers for rate setting are sensitive business information and not freely accessible.  
Furthermore, such an evaluation is too narrow, as it does not reflect on the influence of 
flood insurance on risk reduction efforts , which is becoming increasingly important for future 
insurability and societal resilience. Therefore, the paper also considers additional factors that 
relate to Flood Re’s role in risk reduction. This is based on the understanding that insurance, or 
risk transfer in general, can boost risk reduction if designed and structured accordingly, which in 
turn can secure future affordability and availability of cover. (for an overview see Hudson 2017). 
Various metrics for assessing how insurance promotes risk reduction/prevention have been 
proposed in the literature (including Crichton, 2008; Paudel, 2012; Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 
2014; and Surminski and Eldridge, 2015), exploring how risk pricing may encourage the 
reduction of exposure and lead to lower damage costs (Kunreuther, 1996; and Di Falco et al., 
2014), how risk information and other measures influence the behaviour of policyholders, how 
insurance directly promotes actions by policyholders, and how insurance directly or indirectly 
affects actions by third parties (such as the government).  
 This paper  deploys a mix of quantitative and qualitative metrics and criteria, based on 
available data analysis, stakeholder interviews and a review of existing literature.2 Taken as a 
whole, and given likely inconsistencies in information availability, this broad set of metrics has 
the advantage of providing a robust picture of Flood Re as a public policy intervention, allowing 
for comparison with other intervention types. 
3. Flood Insurance in the UK - the Pathway to Flood Re 
The UK has a long tradition of insurance provision, dating back to the 17th century with 
Lloyds of London starting the commercial underwriting of cargo ships. This partly explains the 
wide acceptance and utilization of insurance to address a wide range of risks, including flooding.  
Historically, the provision of flood insurance in the UK has been addressed through a 
series of informal arrangements reached between the government and the insurance industry, but 
the underwriting has always been provided on a purely private sector basis. The first of these was 
the 1961 Gentleman’s Agreement, which followed a number of significant flooding events such 
as the 1953 East Coast floods (which ultimately resulted in 308 deaths). These events exposed a 
low level of flood insurance penetration (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2014), and triggered efforts by 
government to increase usage of flood insurance. Against the threat of nationalization (Surminski 
and Eldridge, 2015), the industry reached an agreement with the government based on a 
commitment from the insurance industry to provide affordable insurance against flooding, if 
requested to do so, for all private dwellings which were permanently occupied. Because flood 
risk at that time could not be effectively determined per household (for example, through data 
mapping), this involved cross-subsidization between low and high risk homes. Although the 
Gentleman’s Agreement was initially unsuccessful in increasing flood insurance penetration (due 
to the caveat that flood insurance need only be provided when requested by the policyholder), it 
was more successful once the Building Societies Association made insurance coverage a pre-
requisite to obtaining mortgage financing in the 1970s (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2014).  
                                                 
2 The analysis included eight interviews with representatives of the insurance and reinsurance industry in 
the UK, and two interviews with flood insurance experts from the public sector, including the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Further investigations took place as part of the 
ENHANCE analysis of the new Flood Re pool, which included stakeholder workshops in 2014, 2015, and 
2016; see Surminski and Eldridge (2015); Jenkins et al. (2017); Crick et al. (2016); and Surminski and 
Hudson (2017). 
 
 The Gentleman’s Agreement was ultimately challenged by the Association of British 
Insurers (“ABI”) in the wake of rising flood losses. In 2001, the ABI issued a memorandum to 
the government stating that ABI member companies would only maintain insurance provision 
after flood events if there was greater investment in flood risk reduction measures by the 
government in flood prone areas, better data provision and stricter planning regulation. 
Commentators such as Penning-Rowsell et al. (2014) attribute this to a new found sense of 
confidence in the insurance industry following positive feedback for its response to the flooding 
of 10,000 homes in the UK in 2000, and the losses the insurance industry suffered as a result of 
such flooding. Other commentators see these events as merely being a “window of opportunity” 
for change (Kingdon, 1995). Ultimately, this led to a series of Statement(s) of Principle between 
the insurance industry and the government, all based on a mutual interest in a functioning private 
flood insurance system (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015): 
 The 2002 Statement of Principles on the Provision of Flood Insurance, which provided 
for flood coverage generally up to a risk level of 1:75 return period (1.3 percent) for 
households and small businesses as part of their building and/or contents cover.  
 The 2005 updated version of the Statement of Principles, which continued the above 
commitment to 2008. For households exceeding the 1:75 risk level without adopting 
flood defense measures, insurers could not “guarantee to maintain cover”. 
 The 2008 Revised Statement of Principles on the Provision of Flood Insurance, which 
also continued the above commitment to 2013, but did not apply to any new property 
built after 1 January 2009. This has since been carried over into Flood Re. In turn, the 
government agreed to continue investing in flood risk mitigation. 
Although the Statement(s) of Principles have been considered a success in terms of 
expanding flood insurance penetration (reaching approximately 95 percent according to HM 
Government, 2016), insurers have raised concerns about market price distortions in the form of 
underpriced flood insurance for houses in high flood-risk areas, with the ABI estimating that 78 
percent of policyholders were paying a premium that does not fully reflect their flood risk 
(DEFRA, 2014). As a result, households in low flood-risk areas were cross-subsidizing those in 
high-risk areas—as illustrated in Figure 1: 
 Figure 1. Cross-Subsidy for High-Risk Households 
 
Source: DEFRA, 2013. 
However, recent improvements in risk analysis technologies such as data mapping led to 
growing concerns that flood insurance would become unaffordable for those in high flood-risk 
areas once their risk could be properly ascertained by insurers (Oxera, 2015). As such, between 
2010 and 2013, the insurance industry and government took steps to reach an understanding on 
how to replace the Statement(s) of Principles. Negotiations between the government and insurers 
continued through 2012 (Edmonds, 2016). A key point in the debate was the government’s 
aversion to taking on any financial risk of an insurance scheme or flood damages, an example of 
which was delivered by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, who stated that money would be better spent delivering defences rather than 
subsidizing insurance premiums – a position that appeared increasingly at odds with 
theproclaimed government aimof universal availability of coverage and affordability (Hansard, 
2011). 
After a public consultation on four different flood insurance mechanisms, the government 
selected Flood Re, the option that had initially been proposed by the insurance industry. Figure 2 
outlines the pool concept that was presented jointly by the government and the ABI. 
 Figure 2. Pool Concept for Flood Re 
 
Source: Detail taken from the Environment, Flood and Rural Affairs Committee (House of Commons, 2013) on 26th 
February 2013 for the Flood Re insurance proposal and Flood Re Memorandum of Understanding (DEFRA and 
ABI, 2013). 
Flood Re seeks to satisfy the dual objectives of market autonomy and insurance 
affordability. The main idea is a continuation of the provision for households under low to 
normal risk with standard insurance, while giving insurers the option to cede any properties to 
Flood Re at a highly discounted price. The subsidy for the latter is claimed from a levy taken 
from all insurers according to their overall home insurance market share, which is expected to be 
passed on to all policyholders through a surcharge on their insurance policy (Aviva PLC, 2016a), 
which mirrors the cross-subsidization that occurred under the Statement(s) of Principles (Diacon, 
2013). The levy is estimated to be £10.50 per policy. By limiting the insurers’ risk in this way, 
the logic goes that the insurer can in turn limit the premiums they charge to policyholders in high 
flood-risk areas (although this remains at their discretion). Furthermore, Flood Re charges 
insurers an excess of £250, which is expected to limit the excess that insurers charge their clients. 
(Flood Re, 2016a). The levy and premiums are only sufficient to cover the costs associated with 
a 1 in 200 year event (i.e. flooding six times the severity of the 2007 floods). This is the 
regulatory capital limit set by the Prudential Regulation Authority. In accordance with current 
 actuarial modelling, this would amount to approximately £2.5 billion (Diacon, 2013). In the 
event that post-flood claims exceed Flood Re’s reserves, Flood Re can make a levy II call on 
insurers for additional funding. Importantly, there is no formal public back-up mechanism should 
Flood Re become insolvent, however, there is the expectation that the government may step in to 
provide financial support if levy II should still be inadequate to ensure Flood Re’s solvency.  
The flood premiums offered by Flood Re are fixed, based on council tax banding. 
Council tax is a tax levied on domestic property and collected by local councils. The rate of 
council tax differs by property tax bands, which in England are based on the price the property 
would have sold for on the open market on 1 April 1991 (Valuation Office Agency, 2017). For 
example, band A properties are those which would have sold for up to £40,000 (Valuation Office 
Agency, 2017).  As such, property valuations do not represent actual wealth, and there have long 
been concerns that this leads to unfair outcomes. For example, there have been cases of million 
pound properties paying roughly the same council tax as properties of significantly lesser value 
(Brignall, 2012). 
The premium thresholds for 2016 are provided in Figure 3 below: 
Figure 3. Flood Re Premium Thresholds for 2016 
 
Source: Flood Re, 2016b. 
 
The final structure and mode of operation of Flood Re is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 Figure 4. Structure and Mode of Operation of Flood Re 
 
         Source: Crick et al., 2016. 
As it is a reinsurance scheme, consumers have no direct interaction with Flood Re; 
instead, private insurers remain the sole source of flood insurance in the market and it is left to 
their discretion whether or not to cede into the new pool. This has attracted some criticism for 
lacking transparency and hindering opportunities for the sharing of risk information (including 
measures on what risk reduction measures they can adopt to reduce their overall flooding risk) 
(Surminski and Eldridge, 2015).  
Insurance providers representing 85 percent of the flood insurance market have so far 
agreed to participate in Flood Re (Insurance Newslink, 2016).  
Preliminary market data suggests that insurers are applying a degree of selectivity 
regarding which policies they cede to Flood Re. Specifically, they have tended not to opt low 
flood-risk households into Flood Re (e.g. Direct Line Insurance PLC, 2016). This makes sense 
from an economic perspective; if an insurer can offer flood insurance at a rate that is more 
competitive than the premium they are required to pay under Flood Re, there is no incentive to 
cede the relevant policy. This is reflected in Figure 5 below: 
 Figure 5. Flood Re pricing approach 
 
Source: Oxera, 2015. 
4. Assessing Flood Re Against Five Parameters 
4.1 Roles of the Public and Private Sector 
Flood insurance in the UK is unique amongst most other national schemes as it is 
provided entirely by the private market. Flood Re, despite being a public policy intervention, 
does not change this. The pool is an addition to the standard home insurance market rather than a 
replacement (Horn and McShane, 2015). It does not replace private insurance cover but is 
expected to encourage private carriers to write affordable flood insurance policies for high-risk 
properties, as the pool offers insurers a low-cost option to offset the costs of property insurance 
claims for flood damage (BMI Research, 2016). 
There is no direct financial liability for government, unlike in many other pools and 
disaster insurance schemes, where government picks up losses beyond a pre-defined threshold. 
Throughout the negotiations between industry and government this point was highly 
controversial, with the ABI calling for government to take on a clear financial obligation, and 
government refusing to commit. There remains the possibility of government stepping in as an 
emergency bail-out should Flood Re fail, but as the pool has to comply with standard solvency 
 regulation and is buying commercial reinsurance cover this risk is considered to be low by the 
government (DEFRA, 2013). 
Government plays a key role in determining the rules of operation and monitoring as well 
as possibly adjusting the remit and scope of the pool. Furthermore, Flood Re, being created by 
public law, has direct accountability to parliament, with the Secretary of State in an oversight 
function. Flood Re Limited, which has been designated as the scheme administrator under The 
Flood Reinsurance (Scheme and Scheme Administrator Designation) Regulations 2015, is 
required to review Flood Re’s finances at least every five years. The report is provided to the 
Secretary of State who must consider any recommendations made by the scheme administrator in 
the report, including recommendations relating to the levy and premium threshold levels. This 
review process is contained in The Flood Reinsurance (Scheme Funding and Administration) 
Regulations 2015. This arrangement can create some governance confusion - with the 
government treating Flood Re as a quasi-public body, subject to public procurement processes, 
while Flood Re appears to take a much more commercially oriented approach to reinsurance 
purchasing and operations (this observation is based on personal communication from DEFRA 
and Flood Re). It is important to remember that Flood Re was developed and proposed by the 
industry, with companies calling for government intervention.  
Both the previous Statement(s) of Principles and Flood Re can be described as public-
private partnerships (Surminski, 2014). In line with the agreement set out under the Statement(s) 
of Principles, government remains responsible for flood risk management activities such as the 
construction of flood defences and the regulation of water utilities who construct and maintain 
sewers. It also attempts to reduce risk by providing grants to victims of floods, such as following 
Storm Desmond in 2015 (HM Government, 2016). In 2005, the Statement of Principles listed the 
obligations of the government as “reducing the probability of flooding in the UK; at least 
maintaining investment in flood management each year and discussing future funding taking into 
account climate change; implementing reforms to the land use planning system; communicating 
flood risk effectively and providing more detailed higher quality flood risk information and 
developing an integrated approach to urban drainage” (ABI, 2005). The fulfilment of these 
policy demands has been subject to debate—particularly with regards to investment levels and 
success of the planning system. For example, the ABI has been critical of reductions in 
investment in flood defences (ABI, 2010) and a lack of clear lines of responsibility for flood 
defences (Kenning, 2012). Similarly, the ABI has expressed concern in the past with the 
approval of new developments despite the Environment Agency advising against them because 
of their flood risk (ABI, 2009a). Flood Re is less specific on these broader roles of government, 
 but in its first  ‘Transition Plan’ publication, the pool itself acknowledges that it does not have 
strong direct levers to influence flood resilient decisions due to its design and that its success 
does depend on government action in flood risk management (Flood Re 2016b). 
 
The roles of the public and private sectors are summarized in Table 2 below. 
Table 2. The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors 
How are duties split 
between the public 
and private sectors? 
 Insurance industry provides primary cover.  
 Reinsurance market and Flood Re provide reinsurance.  
 Flood Re is a not-for-profit entity, created by statutory law and responsible to 
parliament, but owned and administrated by the private sector.  
 Government has no financial obligations/liability under Flood Re arrangement.  
 Government is responsible for flood risk management and flood risk maps, 
delivered through the Environment Agency.  
 Other public bodies share that responsibility, including local authorities and 
regional boards.  
How much of the 
risk does the public 
sector bear? 
 No formal “insurer of last resort” arrangement. 
 Claims to Flood Re covered by a levy charged to insurance companies based on 
their market share (not on their use of Flood Re). 
 Expected that levy is passed on to all insurance customers - replacing previous 
cross-subsidy. 
 Flood Re is buying commercial reinsurance.  
At what point does 
the public sector 
begin to cover a 
risk? 
 Not formalized. 
 Possibility of public bail-out if Flood Re fails, but no agreed cut-off point.  
 If insufficiently funded, Flood Re can make Levy II call for increased contribution 
from insurers. 
How does the 
program encourage 
or discourage 
private market 
involvement in the 
market?  
 Insurance market is purely private - Flood Re can only work if there is a functioning 
private insurance market. 
 Aim is to encourage flood insurance provision at affordable rate - impact on 
competition is unclear, but expected to be positive as Flood Re has been developed 
by the industry.  
 Complements private reinsurance provision, Flood Re buys own commercial 
reinsurance cover. 
 Allows insurers to better offset costs (BMI Research, 2016). 
4.2 Take-Up Rates of Flood Insurance 
As there is still very limited data on the usage of Flood Re, the following assessment 
looks at overall take-up rates of flood insurance in the UK. This appears to be very high, with 
two separate estimates in 2016 suggesting the take-up rate for homeowners is 95 percent (HM 
Government, 2016) and 98 percent (Flood Re, 2016b). The rate remains similar for homes in low 
 and high flood risk areas (Flood Re, 2016b). The take up rate for renters is lower, reaching 55 
percent in high-risk areas (Flood Re, 2016b). However, earlier statistics suggest that up to 35 
percent of very-low income households have no insurance of any kind (ABI, 2007). Furthermore, 
recent ABI statistics suggest take-up rates are only 76 percent and 64 percent for contents and 
building insurance respectively (ABI, 2015). It is unclear which set of figures provides a more 
accurate portrayal. Importantly, those figures are not specifically for flood risk, but for home 
insurance in general, due to the bundled nature of cover.  
There are two reasons why take-up rates of flood insurance are so high in the UK: (i) 
flood insurance is generally included as standard with building and contents insurance, meaning 
that customers do not choose to get flood insurance, but automatically receive it along with their 
standard cover; and (ii) basic structural flood insurance is a pre-requisite for prospective 
homeowners obtaining a mortgage (HM Government, 2016). As such, the availability of flood 
insurance tends to not be an issue other than for a few properties at high risk that have been 
repeatedly flooded; instead, the main concern for low income households is its affordability 
(DEFRA, 2015).  
In this context, Flood Re is unlikely to have a significant impact on overall take-up rates 
of flood insurance, but should address those cases where high prices or lack of available cover 
might lead to non-purchase of insurance. In a worst case scenario (i.e. the Statement of Principles 
was not renewed), DEFRA estimated that approximately 28,000 households could experience 
insurance price rises in excess of 5% of their income (DEFRA, 2014).  Furthermore, flood 
victims of the 2013/14 floods often faced “impossible” insurance premium increases or could not 
find insurers willing to provide coverage (Ellis, 2014).  Per Hoban (2016), the combined effect of 
increased flooding risk and improved data collection “…led to higher premiums and five figure 
excesses for those at higher risk of flooding”. 
One area where take-up rates are of concern are small and medium sized businesses 
(SMEs). However, SMEs are not covered under Flood Re, with the caveat that government may 
reconsider this decision if availability and affordability of SME cover becomes a growing issue. 
For the moment, industry and government have concluded that the evidence suggests that SMEs’ 
difficulties with flood insurance  are localized problems and would not justify a country wide 
solution (Committee on Climate Change, 2016).  
The take-up rate of flood insurance is summarized in Table 3 below. 
  
 Table 3. Take-Up Rates of Flood Insurance 
What are take-up rates for 
insurance? 
For Homeowners 
 95% (HM Government, 2016). 
 98% (Flood Re, 2016b). 
 
For Renters 
 55% in high-risk areas (Flood Re, 2016b). 
 However, see ABI (2007) statistics, which suggest 
35% of people in very-low income households have 
no insurance of any kind. 
Why are they at this level?  Bundled with other insurance (HM Government, 
2016). 
 Pre-requisite for getting a mortgage (HM 
Government, 2016; and Flood Re, 2016b). 
What are the contributing factors?  Main concern for low income households is the 
affordability of insurance rather than its availability 
(DEFRA, 2015). 
How does disaster aid and/or 
investment in loss reduction 
measures influence take-up rates of 
insurance? 
 Take-up rates historically very high, therefore only 
limited influence in the short term 
How is insurance purchase handled 
for those not able or willing to pay 
for coverage? 
 Flood Re designed to make insurance affordable. 
Not handled for those still unwilling to purchase it.  
How are take-up rates influenced by 
other financing mechanisms and 
other governmental programs, such 
as provision of disaster aid or 
hazard mitigation programs?  
 This does not seem an issue, as shown by high 
penetration rates.  
 
4.3 Distribution of the Costs of Catastrophes 
According to official impact assessments the move from the Statement of Principles to 
Flood Re should not create a significant shift in how the costs of flooding is distributed as the 
pool only formalizes the previous degree of cross-subsidization from low-risk properties to high-
risk properties (Defra 2014). Policies ceded to Flood Re from the £180m flood levy paid through 
the £10.50 surcharge by all policyholders. This is meant to replace the cross-subsidization that 
existed under the Statement of Principles. It is expected that insurers will pass on the subsidized 
reinsurance price when making underwriting decisions, which could also benefit those not ceded 
to Flood Re. For example, leading insurer Aviva has announced plans to remove any additional 
flood excesses on existing customers’ policies at renewal, even if it is not transferred to Flood Re 
 (Aviva PLC, 2016b). However, it is not clear how transparent this (or the estimated additional 
charge of £10.50 per policy) is being made for policyholders.  
The role of subsidies in addressing the equity aspects of flood insurance has been 
discussed for the UK by O’Neill and O’Neill (2012), who warn that any move towards an 
“increasingly individualized, risk-sensitive regime” may lead to social blight. This underpins the 
argument for some form of cross-subsidization between low and high risk homeowners, as now 
formalized under Flood Re. In fact, the ABI argued for this at the beginning of the negotiations, 
stating that “no country in the world has a free market for flood insurance which provides 
affordable and accessible cover for high risk households without some form of government 
involvement and it makes no sense to rule out a subsidy before DEFRA have even done the 
analysis. To ensure potentially 200,000 high risk households have access to flood insurance in 
2013, the government needs to…help develop a sustainable subsidy model which is paid for 
either by taxpayers, low risk households or both” (ABI, 2011).  However, what remains less 
clear is how such a ‘sustainable subsidy model’ should look like, given that in the long-term, 
Flood Re’s key objective is to provide a smooth transition to a free market that applies risk 
reflective pricing. For government and insurers this means that a combination of amending 
premium thresholds and reducing flood risk will be necessary to keep flood insurance affordable 
(Flood Re 2016b). However, the cost of flood insurance may have a negative effect on take-up 
rates of flood insurance by low-income household groups, particularly if the levy would have to 
rise. This will require a careful strategy of targeted subsidies and increasingly risk-based pricing. 
Flood Re’s current pricing model of using  council tax as a rating criteria appears less suitable 
for this:  
. The pool’s use of council tax bands (see Figure 3 above) as a means of setting premiums 
will likely continue to lead to a different kind of cross-subsidization because council tax bands 
are an indicator of wealth, not risk (Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, 2016). Households which 
are asset rich but income poor can expect to pay more for flood insurance due to the higher 
council tax (more valuable house equals higher council tax band) than those which are asset poor 
but have significantly higher disposable income but invest in different assets than their home. 
(Herrington & Carmichael Solicitors, 2009).,  
 Indeed Davey (2015) highlights some regional disparities between the council band 
categories, noting that “…the level of Band A–H houses varies considerably between regions 
and is not perfectly correlated with levels of disposable income. It represents instead historic 
differences in property value” (Davey, 2015).  
 Any distributional impacts arising for those outside the scope of Flood Re, or those who 
are not insured, remain unclear. SMEs and properties built after 2009 are not eligible for Flood 
Re, and it has been argued that this places an unfair burden on SMEs and new home owners. 
However, while the 2009 exclusion rule is presented as a measure to avoid new development in 
high risk areas, it could be subject to political lobbying and be amended. This cut-off date may 
also raise serious questions of justice in the future; for example, what if building on flood plains 
becomes cheaper, and it is the poorest who bear the brunt of flooding? Should new developments 
in this context be excluded? 
For SMEs, the British Insurance Brokers’ Association has confirmed that it is working on 
developing a scheme to make flood insurance more affordable (Barton, 2016). The government 
has also announced that it is considering a Flood Re style mechanism for SMEs (Axling, 2016). 
However, Flood Re maintains the position that because of the differences in risk (for example, 
with regards to BI) a joint pool of homes and SMEs would be unworkable. 
 
Importantly, even though the rate of insurance penetration in the UK is very high, there is 
need for additional disaster aid. Not all flooding costs are insurable. This is because many of 
these costs are not identifiable or financially measurable. On a personal level, these include the 
loss of items of sentimental value, and the loss caused by long-term damage to land. For 
example, there are concerns that land fertility in Somerset has been significantly reduced due to 
hectares of land being inundated for multiple months (Flood Block, 2015). Furthermore, 
insurance will not cover the costs of emergency procedures and repairs faced by local authorities. 
Instead, these costs become covered by initiatives such as the Bellwin Scheme, which reimburses 
local authorities for amounts spent on “taking…immediate action to safeguard life or property; 
or…prevent[ing] suffering or severe inconvenience in their area or among their inhabitants” 
(Sandford, 2015). As such, pre and post-event financing, despite the existence of Flood Re, will 
continue to be covered by a mixture of insurance, government investment and unilateral 
homeowner behaviour. This also applies to homeowners, who face the burden of paying for any 
home resilience measures, often supported through a government grant. As Flood Re does not 
subsidize resilience measures this might lead to an increased burden for homeowners (Penning-
Rowsell and Priest, 2015).  
The distribution of the costs of catastrophes under Flood Re is summarized in Table 4 
below. 
 Table 4. Distribution of the Costs of Catastrophes 
How does this policy distribute the 
costs of a disaster event? 
 Flood Re covers claims on ceded policies through insurer 
premiums and £180m levy from insurers. 
 Insurance industry provides primary cover and cedes to 
Flood Re or commercial reinsurance.  
 Government provides disaster relief to flood victims where 
necessary (e.g. following Storm Desmond in 2015). 
 Government provides disaster relief to local authorities 
where necessary (e.g. Bellwin scheme).  
Are there implicit or explicit cross-
subsidies among groups? 
 Levy imposed on insurers replicates cross-subsidy that 
existed prior to Flood Re (Diacon, 2013). 
 Levy passed on to consumers (i.e. implicit cross-subsidy).  
Is there some level of premium beyond 
which consumers resist paying? 
No evidence - affordability will be reviewed as a criteria during 
the 5-year reviews of Flood Re.  
How are the most extreme events 
financed? 
 If Flood Re lacks funding, Flood Re can make a Levy II call on 
insurers (Flood Re, 2016b). 
 Flood Re liability limited to 1:200 year threshold.  
What is the division between pre-event 
and post-event financing? 
 Insurers pay premiums for ceded policies based on council 
tax banding of properties. 
 Flood Re funded by £180m levy imposed on insurers. 
 Flood re pays out insurance claims to insurers, who then pay 
out policyholders. 
Are lower or middle income 
households or small businesses given 
any assistance with respect to their 
premiums? 
Flood Re is designed to keep prices low and promote 
affordability. No other assistance is provided as part of Flood Re. 
If so, what is the criteria for their being 
given assistance? 
N/A 
4.4 Technical Risk Cost Modelling and Risk Communication 
The insurance industry and Flood Re use a combination of in-house models, commercial 
models (such as RMS and JBA), and government data (such as Environment Agency and 
NAFRA ordinance surveys) to measure their exposure, diversify their portfolios and gain 
regulatory approval.  
Flood risk modelling has made several advances in the UK, particularly in the 
commercial sector, where several models are available and continue to improve in resolution. 
For example, JBA Risk Management released a new high-resolution, multi-peril flood model for 
the UK in 2015 (JBA Risk Management, 2015). This model replaced JBA Risk Management’s 
earlier Great Britain River Flood model. DEFRA and the Environment Agency have also tested 
 the effectiveness of different 2D hydraulic modelling packages as part of the Flood and Coastal 
Erosion Risk Management Research and Development Programme (DEFRA and Environment 
Agency, 2013). The UK’s flood maps are modelled using JBA Risk Management’s software 
JFlow, demonstrating an alignment of industry modelling and publically available data (Clark, 
2017). Figure 6 outlines the kinds of national flood maps currently existing in the UK. Despite 
these improvements some weaknesses remain, particularly with regards to mapping vulnerability 
based on flood area and monetary values, and factoring in effectiveness of flood risk 
management measures. Recent initiatives attempt to align public data and industry modelling, 
particularly with regards to incorporating flood defence information. Another key challenge is 
the lack of surface water flood risk information, where even very high resolution models show 
significant uncertainty. Furthermore, the impact of climate change on disaster event volatility is 
generally not included in these models due to the uncertain nature of climate change itself 
(Committee of Climate Change, 2016). Because of factors such as these, concerns remain with 
regards to the use of public data for insurance pricing. 
 Figure 6. National Flood Maps  
 
Source: HM Government, 2016. 
Overall, any improvement in flood mapping technology would make it easier for insurers 
to individually price insurance policies, and also to decide whether or not to cede policies to 
Flood Re (Oliver, 2016). This reflects a movement away from the historical approach of pooling 
risk and cross-subsidizing between low and high risk policies (Oliver, 2016). The ABI sees risk-
reflective pricing as the optimum because, amongst other things, it encourages competitiveness 
and may promote risk reducing behaviour by policyholders, while also improving the insurability 
of households because there is greater information available to determine individual flooding 
 risk, which allows greater differentiation between properties, to the benefit of those not at risk 
(ABI, 2008). However, at the same time, improvements in flood mapping can make premiums 
unaffordable for households in high risk areas (Oliver, 2016); indeed, protecting homeowners at 
high risk from risk-reflective pricing was the primary motivation for adopting Flood Re as a tool 
for transition. Similar concerns have triggered a review of flood insurance practices in Ireland, 
with a draft flood insurance bill calling for greater restraints by insurance companies when geo-
coding high risk areas (Surminski, 2017). 
Interestingly, the discussion about pricing levels under Flood Re is somewhat flawed due 
to the lack of transparency about flood insurance pricing in general. As flood premiums are 
bundled with other home insurance costs, insurers usually do not disclose to their customers the 
premium load relating to their specific policies. It does not appear as a separate item on the 
standard home insurance policy and customers usually are only made aware of their risk status 
when a dedicated flood excess is charged. Any pricing information is therefore based on market 
estimates from insurers and brokers, and remain difficult to disaggregate or verify.  
In addition to the lack of transparency about flood insurance pricing, there is also no clear 
risk communication between Flood Re and home owners, due to the pool’s role as a reinsurer. It 
remains the decision of the relevant insurance company what information they share with 
customers and how flood risk is communicated, if at all.  
Technical risk cost modelling and risk communication under Flood Re are summarized in 
Table 5 below. 
Table 5. Technical Risk Cost Modelling and Risk Communication Under Flood Re 
How are technical risk costs modelled and 
calculated by insurers and by Flood Re? 
 Insurer: in-house models, commercial models (RMS, 
JBA), government data (Environment Agency, NAFRA) 
 Flood Re uses JBA model. 
To what extent is the “true” cost of the 
risk visible to consumers? 
 Not visible due to bundling of flood insurance with 
household policies. Only visible if there is a flood excess.  
Is cost of risks communicated effectively 
by insurers/Flood Re? 
 See above. 
 Separately, Flood Re does not communicated risks 
directly to policyholders. 
To what degree is risk-reflective rating and 
insurance pricing occurring under Flood 
Re? 
 Flood Re does not impose rate setting on insurers.  
 Goal of transitioning to risk-reflective pricing by 2039. 
Are risk costs incorporated into property 
design, prices, or development decisions?  
 Exclusion of new properties from Flood Re discourages 
development in high flood risk areas. 
   Developments in high risk areas require a flood risk 
assessment from developers. 
4.5 Incentives for Risk Reduction 
Although risk reduction was identified as one of the design principles for future flood 
insurance at the start of the negotiations for a renewed partnership (DEFRA, 2011), it is not a 
central aim of the new insurance pool (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015). Comparing the Statement 
of Principles approach and Flood Re (see Figure 7 below), Surminski and Eldridge (2015) 
conclude that no formal options for incentivizing risk reduction have been adopted in the new 
scheme. 
Figure 7. Comparison of Statement of Principles with Flood Re 
Does the insurance system ... Statement of Principles Flood Re 
… increase risk awareness and 
knowledge of risks through flood 
risk information provision? 
Yes No - but could change if Flood Re 
loss data is shared. 
… build capacity for risk reduction 
through advice on risk reduction 
measures? 
Limited – insurance industry has 
provided advisory guidance for 
home owners 
No 
… provide financial incentives for 
policyholders toward mitigation 
investment? 
No No 
… promote resilient reinstatement 
techniques after a flood loss? 
No No 
… incentivize public flood risk 
management policy? 
Yes; is part of agreement Yes; see the Memorandum of 
Understanding 
…require compulsory risk 
reduction? 
No for policyholders, yes for 
government 
No 
… discourage development in 
flood-risk areas? 
Yes Yes 
Source: Author, based on Surminski and Eldridge (2015). 
 
The one exception is the exclusion of post-2009 properties from Flood Re, which can be 
seen as an incentive for resiliency in developments in flood plains, or as a deterrent for new 
developments in high risk areas (Hoban, 2016). However, it is unclear whether this deterrent will 
have an effect in the long-term. Research suggests that the rate of residential development is 
 increasing in floodplain areas and is higher than in other areas (Committee on Climate Change, 
2015). 9% of this development has been in high risk areas (Committee on Climate Change, 
2015). This may be because Flood Re only became operational in 2016; the next few years will 
give a greater sense of the kind of impact Flood Re is capable of having on development. 
Certain guidance and rules also exist, with new property developments in high risk areas 
requiring a flood risk assessment to support their planning application (Alexander et al., 2016). 
The ABI has also issued guidance to assist developers with building flood resilient properties 
through practical steps such as raising floor levels of properties (ABI, 2009b). However, it is 
unclear how successful these measures are and there is evidence that the costs of risks are 
becoming less of a concern, overridden by the growing concern about lack of housing, which has 
led to planning rules being less strictly applied. In particular, it appears that planning permissions 
have been granted for properties in floodplains even where the Environment Agency has rejected 
them on the basis of flood risk (ABI, 2009a). More recently, the government has adopted a 
policy of providing automatic planning permission on brownfield sites (Edgar, 2015). In 2017, it 
released a white paper containing proposals to address the UK’s housing crisis, including but not 
limited to simplifying the planning process, and a planning framework for property developers 
that will provide quicker processing and determination of planning applications (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2017).  
Beyond this, Flood Re does not have any direct levers to incentivize homeowners, 
insurers or government to reduce flood risk. There is (i) no formal scheme for building capacity 
for risk reduction, (ii) no requirement for compulsory risk reduction, (iii) no program for resilient 
reinstatement techniques after flooding, and (iv) limited commitment from government to do 
more for flood risk reduction (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015). However, Flood Re has committed 
to considering what role it can play to incentivize homeowners to adopt property level risk 
reduction measures within its first two years of operation (Flood Re, 2016b).  
Despite the lack of levers, the risk reduction element remains particularly important for 
Flood Re because of its proposed transition to risk-reflective pricing. It is intended to provide a 
buffer to protect insurance customers from a steep rise in insurance costs, while gradually 
preparing them for a move towards risk-reflective pricing. If and how the transition to risk 
reflective pricing can be achieved without more risk reduction efforts remains very unclear (see 
also Section 5). This has led to criticism, with several commentators calling for Flood Re to 
provide better incentives for risk reduction measures (for example, see Alexander et al., 2016; 
and Surminski and Eldridge, 2015). In response Flood Re has now identified the need to build 
strong partnerships with a range of actors from the public, private and civil society sectors as a 
 key strategy to ensure a successful transition phase (Flood Re, 2016b). Some options for this 
have been outlined in Figure 8: 
Figure 8. Examples of the Role that Flood Re Could Play in Helping to Reduce the Costs 
of Providing Flood Insurance 
 
Source: Flood Re, 2016b. 
While the lack of resilience incentives available to Flood Re is a missed opportunity, 
there are still options to create greater support for flood risk reduction through the pool 
(Surminski and Eldridge, 2015); for example, one opportunity  arises through Flood Re’s own 
data sets. Over the course of its operation, the pool will have a map of high flood risk homes, a 
clearer picture of which of these homes are flooded, the cost of claims and how those costs are 
made up (Flood Re, 2016b). While it remains unclear how this information will be shared in the 
future, Flood Re is considering how it can be utilized to smooth the transition to risk-reflective 
pricing (Flood Re, 2016b). For example, the data could allow the government to calibrate 
 measures for managing flood risk in different areas by providing the information necessary for a 
more thorough analysis of the effectiveness of different risk reduction measures (Surminski, 
2017). It will also provide the information government needs to decide where to build new 
properties, and how to build them. More generally, sharing data may also help to shift the 
conversation between government and the insurance industry to a more long-term focus by 
helping to identify common concerns.   
In addition, there are opportunities for Flood Re to collaborate with insurers to support 
risk reduction, such as in the context of resilient repairs after a flood, through information 
sharing and awareness raising, or combined government lobbying for flood risk management. 
Flood Re could also help to address key underlying barriers for risk reduction: Insurers do not 
necessarily value all kinds of risk reducing behaviour. For example, engineered defences are 
perceived as the “gold standard” for reducing vulnerability, whilst non-engineered measures such 
as warning systems are perceived as ineffective (DEFRA, 2016a). Meanwhile a survey of 400 
homeowners in the UK by Lamond et al. (2009) shows that Insurers have also been ineffective in 
encouraging their policyholders to adopt flood mitigation measures. As Ball et al. (2013) state, 
the adoption of property level measures are difficult to assess so insurers do not necessarily see 
them as a basis for lowering policy costs. These challenges make it unclear how Flood Re can 
engage insurers, who do not necessarily see themselves as having a role to play in incentivising 
risk reduction. However, a good starting point would be an acknowledgement that risk reduction 
is crucial to the future availability of flood insurance (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2015), 
and that common ground therefore exists between government and industry in reducing risk. 
Data sharing may help to establish this rapport by promoting greater collaboration (Surminski, 
2017).  
Table 6 below summarizes Flood Re’s role in incentivizing risk reduction. 
  
 Table 6. Incentives for Risk Reduction 
Does this program have explicit or 
implicit incentives for reducing risk? 
 No formal incentives other than the post-2009 building 
exclusion.  
 The first Flood Re transition plan commits Flood Re to 
consider resilience initiatives within first two years of 
operation. 
 Some insurers encourage customers to apply for 
government’s resilience grant of £5000. 
Do we have evidence on the 
magnitude of these incentives? 
 No evidence available. 
What are the relevant roles of the 
public and private sectors in risk 
reduction? 
 Government provides disaster aid for improving resilience 
(HM Government, 2016). 
 Some (but not all) insurers encourage resilience measures 
(Surminski, 2014; and Lamond et al., 2009). 
Is there any financing in the form of 
loans and grants for hazard mitigation 
as part of the program? 
No, but: 
 Disaster relief provided separately (HM Government, 2016). 
 £700m investment in resilience measures (DEFRA, 2016a). 
 £5000 resilience grants for homeowners from government. 
What has been the government’s role 
in risk protection/reduction and how 
can this role be shown to have 
influenced the pricing and take up 
rates for disaster insurance? 
 Per above. 
 The pricing impact is difficult to determine.  
 Insurers tend to value engineered measures (DEFRA, 2016a), 
but don’t value non-structural measures. 
 Environment Agency’s Long Term Investment strategy. 
 No evidence of specific pricing impact. 
Is their assistance in financing risk 
reduction for lower or middle income 
households? 
 Not as part of Flood Re. 
 See other assistance above and in notes. 
What roles do zoning, building codes, 
and land use play in connection with 
insurance?  
 Business properties not covered by Flood Re (House of 
Commons, 2016). 
 New housing developments not covered. 
 Mixed-use properties generally out of scope (Flood Re, 
2016c).  
 ABI guide for property developers in 2009 (ABI, 2009b). 
In conclusion, the lack of risk reduction incentives creates significant challenges for Flood Re in 
the face of changing risks. This is discussed in Section 5.  
 
 5. Evaluating Flood Re: Fit for Purpose and Fit for the Future? 
Although Flood Re has only been operational for a short period of time, the above 
assessment provides some valuable pointers for a first evaluation. The data collected is 
underpinned by recent quantitative and qualitative analysis, conducted prior to Flood Re 
becoming operational, including the UK government’s economic impact assessment for Flood 
Re (DEFRA, 2014), an actuarial evaluation of government’s insurance modelling (Diacon 2013), 
an agent-based model assessing Flood Re’s operation in the face of future climate change 
(Jenkins et al., 2017), and a qualitative analysis of the design process, aims and objectives of 
Flood Re with a special consideration of flood risk reduction (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015; and 
Surminski and Hudson, 2017). While these calculations and assessments offer only estimates and 
are based on underlying assumptions rather than evidence from the market, they still provide 
useful insights into the mechanics and performance of Flood Re under certain conditions.  
The evaluation looks at two dimensions: is Flood Re “fit for purpose” in terms of 
achieving its statutory aims and objectives; and does the pool offer a forward looking solution to 
address the challenges that led to its creation - in other words, is it “fit for the future”? 
5.1 Fit for Purpose? 
An insurance mechanism created by public policy is subject to different expectations, 
ambitions and assumptions amongst government, industry and other stakeholders. Whether or 
not these are met once the mechanism is in operation depends on many factors, including design, 
behaviour and risk characteristics. A useful starting point for any evaluation is therefore the 
underlying aims and objectives for Flood Re. At the start of the negotiations, a set of principles 
were published by DEFRA, outlining the vision for flood insurance (see Figure 9): 
 Figure 9. Principles for Flood Re Negotiations 
 
                 Source: DEFRA, 2011. 
While offering a very comprehensive list of features for sustainable flood insurance, it 
became obvious during the negotiations that stakeholders saw clear trade-offs between those 
principles, particularly between affordability and risk-reflective pricing (Surminski and Eldridge, 
2015). In subsequent negotiations, the remit of the new flood insurance intervention was limited 
to principles 1, 3 and 8, stating at its core the aim to “ensure the availability and affordability of 
flood insurance, without placing unsustainable costs on wider policyholders and the taxpayer” 
(DEFRA, 2013).  
For Flood Re this implies that it has to satisfy multiple objectives. It seeks to maintain 
market autonomy, keeping the role of government as minimal as possible, and it is conceived as 
a transitional tool, in order to pave the way towards risk-reflective pricing in a private market.  
Evaluating the overall cost effectiveness of the Flood Re policy intervention is 
complicated as it requires more than a basic assessment of the extent to which, for example, a 
subsidy to an insurance provider translates into a reduction in premiums. To fully capture the 
cost effectiveness of insurance interventions, a wider view of the relevant insurance market has 
to be taken. Overall, it will be the behaviour of market participants that will determine how 
Flood Re will be used, what risks will be ceded, the costs of reinsurance for Flood Re itself, and 
if Flood Re will have an impact on primary cover provision. There is commitment and the fact 
that Flood Re has been proposed by the industry indicates that there is willingness from 
companies to use it as a mechanism to support low flood insurance premiums.  
 As such, first indicators show that the private market has adopted Flood Re. Since 
inception, Flood Re is estimated to have underwritten 53,000 policies (based on personal 
communication with Flood Re in October 2016), while the stated annual aim is to reach 350,000 
policies. As it is outside Flood Re’s control whether or not insurers decide to cede their policies, 
it is difficult to interpret these initial figures.  
Flood Re’s ability to pay after a flood event has not been tested, but it had to gain 
regulatory approval under the same conditions as any private market provider, so an acceptable 
level of solvency can be expected. However, it is unclear what would happen should the Flood 
Re pool be exceeded. As discussed above, a levy II call can be made, but if a flooding event 
exceeds the 1:200 threshold, the government will work with the industry to explore available 
options. Importantly, there is no financial commitment from the government to provide public 
funds should the Flood Re pool be depleted. This can be seen as a significant achievement for the 
government, who had to resist lobbying from industry throughout the Flood Re negotiations to 
provide financial guarantees for risks beyond the Flood Re cap and in case that Flood Re’s funds 
should not be sufficient to pay for claims. However, for some observers there is still a clear 
anticipation that government would pay for events beyond the 1/200 PML level (Hornstein, 
2015).  
Early figures also suggest that the price of insurance has remained stable and there have 
been no reports of homeowners struggling to access flood insurance. This indicates that Flood Re 
is delivering on its key aim of ensuring availability and affordability, but a full evaluation will 
only be possible once Flood Re establishes what risks have been ceded and once it is tested by a 
significant flooding event. Market studies to monitor any changes in availability and 
affordability of cover will be required throughout its operation.  
Reducing the insurance premium for those at high risk can be considered a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for cost effectiveness. Changes in take-up rates of insurance are currently 
not visible, but would also need to be monitored. A better picture of cost effectiveness would 
emerge with an understanding of any possible deadweight loss, which captures the degree to 
which the intervention “wastes” money by providing transfers without changing behaviour. A 
full appraisal of Flood Re would also need to consider the primary and secondary benefits 
derived from the pool, as well as any perverse or unintended effects.  
In fact, the cost effectiveness of Flood Re has been questioned by government, openly 
declaring that the proposed scheme does not meet the minimum government standard for cost-
benefits (DEFRA, 2013). Consequently, the Secretary of State had to sign an exemption 
 statement, justifying the policy intervention despite not meeting cost-benefit targets. A key 
argument for the justification came through the wider benefits of Flood Re, referencing “wider 
socio-economic and equity reasons for pursuing the Flood Re scheme which are not fully 
reflected in the strict value for money calculations made in this Impact Assessment - for example 
it brings more certainty to future evolution of insurance prices with beneficial effects not only on 
policy holders but also in other markets such as the property market and mortgage lending. Flood 
Re also ensures industry support in managing a smooth transition during the interim period 
between the Statement of Principles ending and the new policy coming in” (DEFRA, 2014). This 
has been criticized (for example, see Hjalmarsson, 2015), but has not interfered with the 
parliamentary approval process, indicating the high political will to get Flood Re into operation. 
Another key justification for Flood Re’s political approval despite its costliness was the 
argument that Flood Re does not create new forms of subsidization, but merely formalizes the 
already existing degree of cross-subsidization. This was one of the main reasons why Flood Re 
gained the EU’s State-Aid-Exemption approval, alongside its transitional nature (Surminski et 
al., 2015). In its review, the European Commission recognized the goal of ensuring affordable 
insurance against flood risk as a legitimate scope of public policy and adopted the decision not to 
raise objection. The European Commission acknowledged that the pool was designed so as to 
minimize the (competitive) advantage granted to the insurers (Mysiak and Pérez-Blanco, 2016).  
However, a recent report from the Finance Department in Ireland concluded that Flood 
Re had much higher set up costs than originally anticipated (Interdepartmental Flood Policy Co-
ordination Group (“IFPCG”), 2016), which led to the conclusion that the pool would be too 
costly a model for Ireland to follow. In particular, the Finance Department noted that the costs of 
such a scheme would have to be spread over a much smaller number of households, raising 
questions over its viability (IFPCG, 2016). 
5.2 Fit for the Future?  
Flood Re’s other key objective is to provide a smooth transition to risk-reflective pricing. 
The first Flood Re transition plan, published in early 2016, seeks to provide a framework through 
which future transition plans for removing the subsidy provided under Flood Re can be analysed 
and implemented. In particular, it notes that a combination of amending premium thresholds and 
encouraging disaster risk reduction strategies will be necessary to keep flood insurance 
affordable as it transitions to risk-reflective pricing. This will need to be carefully balanced. If 
such cross-subsidization remains, there may be little incentive for policyholders in high flood-
risk areas to make their properties more resilient, making premium levels unsustainable 
 following transition to a risk-reflective market. To reiterate, creating this incentive is seen as one 
of the key benefits of risk-reflective pricing (see ABI, 2008; and Oxera, 2015).  
Figure 10 demonstrates how premium thresholds would have to change over time in 
order for Flood Re to transition to risk-reflective pricing. “D” and “G” refer to the council tax 
band of properties. “Outcome B” refers to “a market where household flood insurance is widely 
available at a price that is regarded as affordable”. 
Figure 10. Indicative Potential Changes to Premium Thresholds 
 
         Source: Flood Re, 2016b. 
According to the first Flood Re transition plan, Flood Re aims to phase out the annual 
insurer levy of £180m by gradual price reduction, while attempting to maintain premium 
threshold levels, through the following combination of factors: reduction in risk of flooding, 
reduction in cost of flooding, and increased competition in the insurance market (Flood Re, 
2016b). However, it remains unclear whether or not the risk environment would allow such a 
transition. This raises the question whether Flood Re is fit for the future.  
Rising losses and increased volatility can affect the fine balance between affordability 
and profitability for insurers. In extreme cases this could lead to insurers withdrawing from 
certain markets and regions, as highlighted by the Prudential Regulation Authority (Prudential 
Regulation Authority, 2015). While the recent flood loss trends in the UK are largely due to 
socio-economic factors, such as more development in exposed areas, climate change is expected 
to exacerbate these impacts (IPCC, 2013). One important aspect therefore is if and how flood 
insurance provision can be integrated into overall risk management and climate change 
adaptation efforts, and how insurers can collaborate with other stakeholders (particularly the 
government) to achieve greater resilience and ensure future insurability.  
 The lack of risk reduction incentives can therefore be seen as a major drawback for Flood 
Re. The Committee on Climate Change has found that, in its current design, Flood Re is likely to 
be counter-productive to the long-term management of flood risk as it does not provide enough 
incentives for high-risk households to put measures in place to avoid or reduce flood damage 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2015). This raises the question of whether, in its current format, 
Flood Re will achieve its aim of moving towards risk-reflective pricing while maintaining 
insurance affordability. 
Indeed, a recent study by Jenkins et al. (2017) finds that Flood Re is likely to lead to an 
increasing gap between subsidized premiums and technical risk price, as summarized in Figure 
11. These findings were highlighted by the Bank of England in its first report on the impact of 
climate change on the insurance industry, calling for more efforts to address underlying risk 
drivers (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2015). 
Figure 11. Pricing implications of rising risks levels 
 
Source: adapted from Jenkins et al., 2017 and Prudential Regulation Authority, 2015. 
The underlying agent-based model simulation of Flood Re shows that the pool is 
beneficial in its function to provide affordable insurance, even under climate change; in 
particular, the study finds that Flood Re would achieve its aim of securing affordable flood 
insurance premiums. However, the analysis also highlights that Flood Re would be placed under 
increased financial strain if challenged with increasing risk as highlighted by future climate 
change projections. If the intended transition to risk-reflective pricing is to take place, then a 
determined and coordinated strategy would be needed to manage flood risk, which utilizes 
 insurance incentives, limits new development, and supports resilience measures (Jenkins et al., 
2017). 
The agent-based model also provides a platform to investigate the transitional 
mechanisms recently proposed as part of the Flood Re scheme (Flood Re, 2016b), as well as how 
changes to regulatory measures and the roles and behaviour of different stakeholders could be 
enhanced to support flood risk reduction under future climate change (Jenkins et al., 2017). A 
key issue is how the scheme will cope with the increasing gap between subsidized and risk-
reflective premiums given urbanization and climate change, and what impact an increase in 
demand for Flood Re could have. While the simulations indicate that Flood Re could ensure the 
affordability of insurance to homeowners, even under future climate change, this is modelled 
here without constraint on the number of properties which can be placed into Flood Re. 
However, an extension of Flood Re to include more properties could have significant 
consequences for Flood Re’s funds and reinsurance cover, with affordable cover becoming 
harder to sustain under the future scenarios. 
In conclusion, there are several pressure points that could threaten the proposed transition 
to risk-reflective pricing. If flood risk continues to rise, this would be likely to increase take-up 
under Flood Re, while the gap between technical risk price and the Flood Re price would 
continue to widen. This would become a major challenge for government, which might have to 
intervene to plug this widening gap by providing funds or back-up cover for Flood Re. Political 
will, risk behaviour and, most importantly, the success of public flood risk management policies 
will determine the future of Flood Re. For many observers Flood Re is a stop-gap, or “a 
breathing space for government to implement more resilient flood defences” (Institute and 
Faculty of Actuaries, 2016). 
5.3 Suggestions 
In light of these limitations, a number of suggestions can be made to improve Flood Re’s 
performance.  Perhaps most importantly, Flood Re will not achieve risk reduction on its own.  
Even if it does encourage some policyholders to reduce their own risk, it may not be the case that 
those investments are effective or have a positive effect on insurance premiums. Instead, a broad 
suite of stakeholders ranging from banks, developers and architects to local government 
authorities need to be suitably engaged if the goal of reducing flood risk is to be achieved. This is 
discussed by Crick et al. (2016), who demonstrate through the application of an agent-based 
model that engaging other stakeholders, particularly developers and local government 
authorities, can have a positive impact on risk reduction.  For example, their analysis shows that 
 requiring developers to build new properties with sustainable drainage systems can significantly 
reduce flood risk; however, imposing additional financial obligations on developers (e.g. 
requiring developers to pay a share of flood insurance) may not have a significant impact.  
Importantly, this also suggests that flood insurance itself may have a limited role to play in 
engaging other stakeholders.  Similarly, Crick et al. (2016) demonstrate that simply requiring 
local government authorities to approve new developments has little impact on flood risk.  
However, a combined approach of, for example, local governments setting a more stringent 
development approval ratio together with setting lower acceptable flood risk levels can have a 
positive impact on reducing flood risk. 
More generally, Jenkins et al. (2017) demonstrate the significant impact that sustainable 
drainage systems and other property level protection measures can have on reducing flood risk, 
with their research suggesting reductions of up to 23% are possible.  This supports a measure 
such as requiring developers to include sustainable drainage systems in new developments.  
However, Jenkins et al. (2017) also demonstrate that investment in such measures may not be 
sufficient to prevent flood risk increasing over time, particularly in the context of climate change. 
As such, the gap between subsidized and risk-reflective premiums under Flood Re is likely to 
continue increasing, and this raises serious questions of how policyholders will be able to afford 
premiums after Flood Re transitions to risk-reflective pricing.  This also appears to limit the role 
that banks and other lending institutions, which have a clear interest in promoting risk reduction 
in order to safeguard their mortgage agreements, can play in flood risk management. However, 
there remains a lack of analysis around this issue, and further statistical studies taking into 
account action by a broader range of stakeholders may suggest otherwise. The author 
recommends further studies into such dynamics. Innovation in property level protection 
measures may also make a significant contribution in the future.  
6. Concluding Observations 
Flood insurance is technically challenging and often highly politically charged, with 
questions of fairness, justice, and effectiveness appearing at the interface between public and 
private sector activities. Therefore, any effort to reform an existing scheme or introduce a new 
insurance solution needs to reflect on the broader context: what are the aims and objectives of 
different stakeholders? Where is existing capacity to underwrite, inform, incentivize, and take 
action to reduce risks? And how can insurance provide a mechanism that allows transparency 
about risk levels and risk trends, ensures fair and equitable access to those who need it while not 
creating unnecessary burdens for those who do not? Addressing these points is difficult in any 
 context, but when changing risk levels and conflicting views on responsibilities and ownership 
are added to the mix this becomes one of the infamous “wicked problems” of planning and 
decision-making (Rittel and Webber, 1973).  
This explains why there is such a patchwork of flood insurance approaches in operation 
across the world, and why a large number of countries still have no such insurance at all.  
In broad terms, the approaches follow either a solidarity-based concept, such as in 
France, where mandated through the government, all policyholders contribute and thus support 
those at high risk. The alternative is a fully risk-reflective approach, using risk-reflective pricing 
as a way to steer individuals and society towards a more resilient future. While this is widely 
seen as the rational way forward, in many cases, it is politically impossible without significant 
subsidization of those facing costly insurance premium. Flood Re can be seen as an effort to 
bridge both worlds - a solidarity based first phase, which would then gradually shift towards a 
risk-reflective system in the longer run. Still, there remain questions about eligibility, which 
appear subject to political lobbying rather than based on sound technical assessment. Hence, 
Flood Re’s scope of cover might be adjusted, with SMEs and new-build properties potentially 
becoming eligible for cover. For Flood Re, the expansion of scope and rising take-up rates by 
insurers would require a revision of the underlying funding model and might lead to a 
reassessment of the required size of the pool funds.  
Overall the success of Flood Re will heavily depend on risk trends, loss events, and 
market behaviour. A series of floods, together with an improved understanding of growing future 
risks, vulnerabilities and exposure levels would place strain on any insurance system, public or 
private. The only truly sustainable response would be a significant increase in efforts to address 
the underlying risks by the government. Anything to reduce likelihood of loss would help to 
secure affordability and availability of insurance. This would also support those who are not 
benefitting from insurance by resilient communities, businesses and individuals, which in turn 
would help address the broader costs of floods, including those intangible aspects such as 
emotional stress, health issues or economic competitiveness for communities and regions.  
In times of rising risk, this is the main selling point for insurance: if correctly designed 
and implemented, it can be very influential in driving societal resilience, while also delivering 
economic benefits. However, as Flood Re shows, this is still lagging in practice. And indeed, 
there are concerns that flood insurance can de-incentivize resilience, creating a false sense of 
security. This is the area where Flood Re could play a significant role by sending the right 
 signals that would help to prepare homeowners for a risk-reflective approach to insurance. But 
until today this remains a missed opportunity.  
 
The debate about flood insurance in the UK thus illustrates a fundamental challenge: the concern 
about affordability is usually seen in a short-term context, often driven by election cycles and the 
one-year nature of insurance contracts, while there is no strategy for the longer-term. Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan (2009) support this, noting that short-term election considerations mean 
politicians may choose to focus on areas with more political capital (e.g. providing disaster 
assistance with immediately visible benefits rather than focusing on risk reduction, where the 
benefits tend to be derived in the long-term). As such, less focus may be placed on risk reduction 
due to its non-immediate benefits. While it is laudable that the government appears committed to 
risk-reflective pricing, whether or not this will be achieved through Flood Re remains highly 
questionable. The pool has a 23 year life span and is built on the assumption that over this time 
government, homeowners and other stakeholders will do their bit to reduce flood risk, thus 
leading to a situation where no further public intervention in the market would be required. As 
the above evaluation shows, this appears to be wishful thinking rather than a sound strategy. 
Flood Re, government and industry now need to explore how  to support  this transition. This 
would require a clear commitment to risk reduction and flood resilience, recognizing that this is 
the only viable way to ensure future insurability of these risks [Surminski and Thieken 2017; see 
also Ermoliev et al., 2000 for an earlier investigation of this].  
This paper shows that insurance’s broader role of supporting flood resilience and flood risk 
reduction is far from exhausted and that there is the possibility to enhance this further through 
better collaboration between industry and government. 
 
The challenges faced by Flood Re therefore raise a number of important policy implications:  
Firstly, in order to harness Flood Re to increase overall resilience, greater involvement is 
needed from other agents whose behaviour determines the flood resilience of homes. Banks, 
property developers, planning officials, architects, local government and the built environment 
industry are just a few of those stakeholders who are indirectly benefitting from insurance 
without paying for it, and whose actions determine the resilience of buildings and systems. There 
is the possibility for insurance to incentivize and engage those stakeholders (Crick et al., 2016), 
but at the moment how it can do so is still largely unexplored.  
Secondly, the distributional effects of Flood Re merit further attention. This applies to the 
treatment of SMEs, who may need a separate flood insurance scheme going forward (Axling, 
 2016), as well as to inequities that arise through the use of council tax banding as a rating 
mechanism.  
Thirdly, the data collected by Flood Re should be harnessed with a view to addressing the 
above two problems. In relation to the first, it can promote collaboration between stakeholders 
and raise the profile of flooding as a long-term problem for the insurance industry which requires 
long-term thinking. Loss data may also help to engage other stakeholders wishing to understand 
how to manage their own vulnerabilities (e.g. mortgage providers). In relation to the second, 
Flood Re’s data collection will provide a wealth of information that will allow the government to 
target risk reduction measures to those areas most in need (and therefore may reduce the negative 
effects of Flood Re’s transition to risk-reflective pricing for high-risk households regardless of 
council tax banding).  
Ultimately, it is very clear that insurance is not a silver bullet, and it needs to be 
supported and integrated into a solid flood risk management approach. This is important for 
those countries that have insurance, but even more so for newly emerging markets or developing 
countries. Insurance against floods or other climate risks should be considered with healthy 
scepticism unless it can be developed with risk reduction and stakeholder influence in mind.  
Therefore it is important that Government, insurers and homeowners understand that the success 
of Flood Re will depend on how well flood risk is managed. The pool should become a lever for 
more investment in flood defences, more efforts to increase property resilience and improved 
land-use. Flood Re’s Memorandum of Understanding captures some of this spirit, but remains 
more vague than its predecessor, the Statement of Principles. The commitments made under the 
Memorandum of Understanding include spending £2.3 billion on flood defences to 2021 (Flood 
Re, 2016b) but there is scepticism that the government will achieve its protection targets 
(Environmental Audit Committee, 2016).  
Overall, it is still very early days for Flood Re, and much of the underpinning analysis in 
this paper is driven by assumptions, expectations and scenarios, rather than hard evidence from 
the market. It is therefore very important for Parliament and the insurance regulator to monitor 
all the variables outlined above and see how Flood Re and the wider market perform and fulfil 
the statutory duties under the Flood Re legislation. Importantly, this should not simply focus on 
pure underwriting practices, but it should also consider how wider risk trends and flood risk 
behaviour develop. Therefore Flood Re’s activities should also be closely monitored by those 
tasked with assessing the UK’s response to climate risks, such as the Committee on Climate 
Change. And importantly, as this paper shows, this monitoring should look at both Flood Re’s 
performance today as well as its ability to play a role in supporting societies’ flood resilience. 
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